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This paper is about an encryption based approach to the secure implementation of feedback controllers for
physical systems. Specifically, Paillier’s homomorphic encryption is used to digitally implement a class of lin-
ear dynamic controllers, which includes the commonplace static gain and PID type feedback control laws as
special cases. The developed implementation is amenable to Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) realiza-
tion. Experimental results, including timing analysis and resource usage characteristics for different encryp-
tion key lengths, are presented for the realization of an inverted pendulum controller; as this is an unstable
plant, the control is necessarily fast.
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1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Motivation
Advances in communication, control, and computer engineering have enabled the design and im-
plementation of large-scale systems, such as smart infrastructure, with remote monitoring and
control, which is often desired due to the geographical spread of the system and requirements for
flexibility of design (to accommodate future expansions). These positive features however come at
the cost of security threats and privacy invasions [14, 44, 53, 58].
Security threats can be decomposed into multiple categories based on resources available to
adversaries [52]. A basic security attack that requires relatively few resources is eavesdropping
in which an adversary monitors communication links to extract valuable information about the
underlying system. Eavesdropping is often a starting point for more sophisticated attacks [56].
These attacks have resulted in the use of encryption [42, 55]. Figure 1 (a) illustrates the schematic
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Fig. 1. The schematic diagram of a networked control system with (a) normal encryption and (b) semi-
homomorphic encryption-decryption units.
diagram of a typical secure cyber-physical system with encryption. The actuator, system, and
sensor (sometimes together referred to as the plant) form the physical system thatmust be remotely
monitored and controlled. The physical system can be the electricity grid, transportation network,
or a building, for example. Note that, although a single node is used in Figure 1 (b) to denote the
sensor, in general it can comprise a collection of spatially distributed sensors. That is, the sensors
can be spread geographically within the underlying physical system to measure appropriate states
in different locations, e.g., voltages and frequencies at various locations in an electricity grid. The
same also goes for the actuator. The addition of the encryption and decryption units in Figure 1 (a)
protects the overall system against eavesdroppers on the communication network; however, it does
not provide any protection if the eavesdropper infiltrates the controller or if the controller itself is
the eavesdropper (in industrial espionage). This is because sensitive information is decrypted prior
to entering the controller and is thus readily available there. This motivates the use of a system,
depicted in Figure 1 (b), with homomorphic encryption enabling controller computations to be
performed on encrypted numbers.
In practice, the (physical) system in Figure 1 (b) is a continuous-time dynamical system. To con-
trol the system, the sensors sample the outputs of the system at regular intervals and transmit
these measurements to the controller through communication networks (e.g., WiFi or Bluetooth
for short ranges or the Internet for longer ranges). The controller computes the necessary com-
mands based on the received measurements and forwards the commands to the actuators for im-
plementation. The actuators then apply and hold the received control signal for a fixed duration.
This methodology for digital control of physical systems is often, unsurprisingly, referred to as
sample and hold [18]. Before each new sample can be processed by the controller, it must process
the previous one, compute the control inputs, and transmit the control inputs to the actuators.
Therefore, the sampling rate of the sensors cannot be faster than the inverse of the worst-case
delay/latency caused by the required computations and communications. On the other hand, in
order to guarantee stability and performance of the overall closed-loop system, we must ensure
that the sampling occurs regularly and faster than a certain level (related to how fast the controlled
systems dynamics need to be) [18].
In [16], a general purpose microprocessor based system, specifically a Raspberry Pi, was used to
control a differential-wheeled robot in real-time using an encrypted controller. Controlling such a
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robot is not a complicated task as the underlying system is stable and, if the control signal is not
updated with regular timing, the system would not violate safety constraints so long as it is re-
stricted to move very slowly. Further, slowing down the sampling rate in this robot only degrades
the performance by making it slower, not resulting in undesirable behaviours. In safety critical ap-
plications, however, the timing of the control loop is crucial; if we cannot ensure that the controller
is able to provide the correct actuation signal within the sampling time of the system, then safe
operation of the system cannot be guaranteed. Having tight control on the timing is unfortunately
not always possible on general purpose microprocessor based systems with operating systems be-
cause computations and their timings are subject to the operating system scheduling. Even without
an operating system, the time sequential nature of software implementations for execution on a
general purpose processor can be limiting from the perspective of achievable sampling rate. This
motivates the design of a custom digital engine, amenable to realization on Field-Programmable
Gate Arrays (FPGAs), for performing the necessary computations. This is the focus of the devel-
opments presented below.
1.2 Contributions
In this paper, we use homomorphic encryption, specifically the Paillier encryption scheme [41], to
implement linear control laws. This includes many popular control laws, such as static gain [21],
proportional-integral-derivative (PID) control [3] and linear quadratic regulators (LQR) [21]. Lin-
ear control laws, such as PID controllers, have been heavily used within the industry for regulating
nonlinear physical systems and are of practical relevance [2]. Although the paper presents the dig-
ital system implementation within the context of Paillier encryption, the underlying methodology
is applicable, in principle, to other homomorphic encryption methods that rely on the exponentia-
tion of large integer numbers, such as RSA and ElGamal encryption [15, 46]. After the quantization
and transformation of the controllers for implementation on ciphertexts, modular multipliers and
exponentiators are implemented using Montgomery multiplication [26, 38]. These modules can be
used in parallel for encryption, controller computations, and decryption. We analyze the timing
of an FPGA realization of such an implantation of a feedback controller, and present experimental
results for the control of an unstable system, namely, an inverted pendulum.
1.3 Related Studies
The study of homomorphic encryption, a form of encryption that enables computations to be
carried out on the encrypted data, dates back to the pioneering result of [45] after observing semi-
homomorphic properties in RSA [46]. Semi-homomorphic encryption only allows for a smaller
number of operations to be performed on the encrypted data in contrast with fully homomor-
phic encryption. For example, in the case of RSA and ElGamal encryption [15] multiplication of
plaintext data corresponds to multiplication of encrypted data, and in the case of Paillier encryp-
tion [41] summation of plaintext data corresponds to multiplication of encrypted data. The Gentry
encryption scheme [19] is the first fully-homomorphic encryption scheme that allows both mul-
tiplication and summation of plain data through appropriate arithmetic operations on encrypted
data. Subsequently, other fully homomorphic encryption methods have been proposed, e.g., [9, 54].
The computational burden of fully-homomorphic encryption methods is often much greater than
that of semi-homomorphic encryption methods.
Homomorphic encryption has been used previously for third-party cloud-computing services [1,
17, 20, 32, 35, 60]. More recent studies [16, 25, 27, 28, 50] have considered challenges associated
with the use of homomorphic encryption in closed-loop control of physical systems, such as main-
taining stability and performance, albeit without considering timing concerns (by not getting into
the computational time of encryption, computation, and decryption and assuming all underlying
computations are instantaneous). None of these studies consider dynamic control laws; they are
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all restricted to static control laws without any form of memory. This is because, in dynamical
control laws with an encrypted memory, the number of bits required for representing the state
of the controller can grow linearly with the number of iterations. This renders the memory of
such control laws useless after a certain number iterations due to an overflow or an underflow1.
We borrow theoretical results from [39, 40, 43, 51] to propose a finite-memory implementation of
dynamic controllers over ciphertexts.
An alternative to homomorphic encryption is secure multi-party computation based on secret
sharing or other forms of encryption (possibly non-homomorphic encryption methodologies). A
well-known method for secure multi-party computation is the Yao protocol, which was originally
developed for secure two-party computations [59]. The protocol provides a method for evaluating
a Boolean function without any party being able to observe the bits that flow through the circuit
during the evaluation. This has been proved to be secure [34] and efficiently implementable for
Boolean functions [33]. However, when dealing with more general mappings, i.e., non-Boolean
functions, the efficiency of the protocol is limited as the problem of finding the most efficient
Boolean representation of a function, in terms of the efficiency of implementing the Yao pro-
tocol [29], is not trivial [30]. Another approach is to utilize secret sharing in which a secret is
divided into multiple shares and each party receives one share, which appears random to the re-
ceiving party. Then, appropriate computations on the secret shares can be performed to evaluate
the outcome [10, 23]. Application of secret sharing to general problems is difficult and the digital
design becomes problem specific to the application.
Finally, note that the Paillier encryption scheme has been recently implemented on FPGAs
in [47]; however, that paper considered the problem of privacy-preserving data mining, which
has different requirements in comparison to real-time encrypted control. This difference in re-
quirements resulted in the consideration of a different implementation architecture in this paper.
In particular, the binomial expansion for the specific choice of the exponential base is exploited
to achieve fast encryption in this paper. Further, there are differences between the operations re-
quired for data mining and controller computation.
1.4 Paper Outline
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the building blocks of the networked
control systems in Figure 1 (b) are presented and we describe the implementation of the control
laws over ciphertexts. In Section 3, the digital design for FPGA realization is described. We present
the experimental results for the control of an inverted pendulum in Section 4. Finally, we conclude
the paper and present avenues for future research in Section 5.
2 SECURE FEEDBACK CONTROL
In this section, we discuss encryption, decryption, and controller blocks of the networked control
systems in Figure 1 (b).
2.1 Feedback Controller
In this paper, we consider dynamic controllers of the following form:
C : x[k + 1] =
{
Ax[k] + B(s[k] − y[k]), k + 1modT > 0,
0, k + 1modT = 0,
(1a)
u[k] = Cx[k], (1b)
where x[k] ∈ Rnx is the controller state, u[k] ∈ Rnu is the vector of control inputs to the physical
system, y[k] ∈ Rny is the vector of plant outputs, and T is the number of time steps between
1Underflow refers to the case where number of fractional bits required for representing a number becomes larger than the
allowed number of fractional bits in a fixed-point number basis.
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controller state resets. Conditions for selecting T with stability and performance guarantees are
presented in [40]. The class of controllers in (1) covers static, reset integral, reset lead and lag
controller. For instance, in the case of static controllers, A = 0, B = I , andC is the static gain of the
controller. Note that there is a delay of one sampling time between measurement and actuation,
modelling computation and communication time associated with the networked controller. For
static controllers, since the controller’s state is not accumulative and only acts as a delay, we can
setT = ∞without concerns about state overflow or underflow. For reset proportional-integral (PI)
controllers, A = diag(1, 0) with diag(a) denoting a diagonal matrix whose main diagonal is equal
to a, B = [∆t 1]⊤ with ∆t > 0 denoting the sampling time of the control system, and C = [KI Kp ]
with KI and Kp denoting, respectively, the integral and proportional gains. Note that PI control
laws have been heavily used within the industry for regulating/controlling nonlinear physical
systems [2] and, therefore, the choice of linear dynamic controllers is of practical relevance. In this
paper, we consider resetting dynamic control laws because implementing encrypted controllers
over an infinite horizon is impossible due to memory issues (through repeated multiplication of
fixed point numbers in the plaintext domain, the numbers of the bits required for representing the
fractional and integer parts of plaintext numbers continuously grow, and there is no simple way
to truncate with small error when working in the encrypted domain). Resetting controllers have
been previously studied in [39, 40, 43, 51].
2.2 Homomorphic Encryption
A public key encryption scheme can be described by the tuple (P,C,K, E,D), where P is the set of
plaintexts, C is the set of ciphertexts, K is the set of keys, E is the encryption algorithm, and D is
the decryption algorithm. As such encryption schemes are asymmetric, each key κ = (κp ,κs ) ∈ K
is composed of a public key κp (which is shared with everyone and is used to encrypt plaintexts),
and a private key κs (which is kept secret and is used to decrypt ciphertexts). The algorithms E
and D are publicly known, and use the keys as parameters, which are generated for each new
use-case. It is required that D(E(x ,κp),κp ,κs ) = x .
Definition 2.1 (Homomorphism in Cryptography). Apublic key encryption scheme (P,C,K, E,D)
is homomorphic if there exist operators ◦ and ⋄ such that (P, ◦) and (C,⋄) are algebraic groups and
E(x1,κp ) ⋄ E(x2,κp ) = E(x1 ◦ x2).
Typically, the sets P and C are finite rings of integers ZnP and ZnC respectively. Then, the mod-
ular addition operation (x1 ◦ x2 = (x1 + x2)modnP ) and the modular multiplication operation
(x1 ◦ x2 = x1x2modnP ) both form groups with P. If there exists an operator ⋄ that satisfies the
definition of a homomorphic encryption scheme when ◦ is defined as modular addition, we call
the encryption scheme additively homomorphic. Likewise, if there exists an operation ⋄ that sat-
isfies the definition of a homomorphic encryption scheme when ◦ is defined as modular multi-
plication, we call the encryption scheme multiplicatively homomorphic. If both these properties
hold, the encryption scheme is called fully-homomorphic; if only one description applies, it is
semi-homomorphic. Importantly, the properties of fully-homomorphic and semi-homomorphic
encryption schemes allow additions and multiplications of plaintexts to be performed through
the generation of a ciphertext from other ciphertexts, without any intermediate decryptions and
encryptions.
Encryption schemes, such as Paillier [41], RSA [46], and ElGamal [15], are examples of semi-
homomorphic encryption. The Paillier encryption scheme is additively homomorphic, while the
RSA and ElGamal encryption schemes are multiplicatively homomorphic. These homomorphic
encryption schemes have been used in the literature to ensure privacy and security when various
ACM Transactions on Cyber-Physical Systems, Vol. 0, No. 0, Article 0. Publication date: 2019.
0:6 J. Tran et al.
computational tasks, such as computing set intersections, data mining, executing arbitrary pro-
grams, and controlling dynamical systems, are performed by untrusted parties; see, e.g., [1, 16, 20,
32, 35, 40, 60] and references there-in for examples. The above-mentioned homomorphic encryp-
tion schemes involve calculating modular exponentiations (i.e., ba modM for positive integers a, b,
andM), which is a computationally expensive operation. The time required to perform encryption,
decryption, and homomorphic operations on ciphertexts, depends largely on the speed with which
modular exponentiation can be achieved. This can potentially limit the usability of homomorphic
encryption schemes for real-time control of physical systems.
Definition 2.2 (Indistinguishability under Chosen Plaintext). Consider a scenario in which a poly-
nomial-time-bounded adversary provides two plaintexts. One of these plaintexts is randomly cho-
sen and encrypted. An encryption scheme is said to be indistinguishable under chosen plaintext
attack, if the adversary has a negligible advantage2 over guessing which of the two plaintexts were
encrypted, using any information apart from the private key.
Indistinguishability under chosen plaintext is a desirable property because an adversary is un-
able to determine the decryption of a ciphertext, by trialling encryption of likely plaintexts. The
RSA encryption scheme does not have this property unless modified to OAEP-RSA [5]. The Paillier
and ElGamal encryption schemes have this property, as they introduce a large random number
during encryption, allowing a single plaintext to encrypt non-deterministically to many possi-
ble ciphertexts, which removes any significant advantage in trialling encryption of likely plain-
texts [15, 41].
In what follows, we use Paillier encryption scheme as it is additively homomorphic and satisfies
indistinguishability under chosen plaintext attack. Note that the ideas of this paper can be readily
used for other homomorphic encryption relying on modular exponentiation. Paillier encryption
works as follows. First, two large prime numbers p and q are randomly chosen to generate keys.
The public key is κp = N = pq and the private key is κs = (λ, µ) = (lcm(p − 1,q − 1), λ−1modN )
where lcm(a,b) denotes the least common multiple of integers a and b. Note that λ−1modN is
a unique integer µ in ZN such that λµmodN = 1. In the Paillier encryption scheme, the set
of plaintexts and ciphertexts are, respectively, P = ZN and C = ZN 2 . Encrypting a plaintext t
is done by calculating E(t) = (N + 1)trN modN 2, where r ∈ {x ∈ ZN | gcd(x ,N ) = 1} is
randomly chosen. Note that, because of using N + 1 as the exponentiation basis in the encryption
algorithm, it can be rewritten as E(t) = (Nt + 1)rN modN 2. This property follows from the use of
binomial expansion because (N +1)trN modN 2 = (
∑t
i=0
(t
i
)
N i )rN modN 2 = (Nt +1)rN modN 2+
(N 2
∑t
i=2
(t
i
)
N i−2)rN modN 2 = (Nt+1)rN modN 2.Using this propertymakes our implementation
of the encryption considerably faster than [47]. Decryption of a ciphertext c is done by calculating
D(c) = L(cλ modN 2)µmodN , where L(u) = (u − 1)/N .
The additive homomorphic property follows from D(E(t1,κp )E(t2,κp ),κp ,κs ) = t1 + t2modN .
Further, we have D(E(t1,κp )t2 ,κp ,κs ) = t1t2 modN . Note that this is not a true multiplicative ho-
momorphic property, as t2 is not encrypted; the encrypted result is formed from one ciphertext
and one plaintext, rather than two ciphertexts. In the remainder of this paper, we use ⊕ to denote
the additive homomorphic operator on ciphertexts and ⊗ to denote the pseudo-multiplicative ho-
momorphic operator, i.e.,
c1 ⊕ c2 :=(c1c2)modN
2
, (2a)
t ⊗ c :=ct modN 2. (2b)
2Negligible advantage means that the difference between the probability of guessing the correct plaintext and the proba-
bility of guessing the wrong plaintext goes to zero rapidly as the key length goes to infinity [24].
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2.3 Secure Controller Implementation
The computations required to implement the controller in (1) are additions andmultiplications. We
restrict the controller input to fixed-point numbers and use the mapping from fixed point numbers
to the integers from [16]. This allows the equivalent operations of addition and multiplication
to be effectively applied to fixed point numbers and integers over the ciphertext. The effect of
the quantization error can be made arbitrarily small by increasing the number of bits used to
represent the underlying numbers (specifically the number of fractional bits), at the expense of
increased computational cost [16, 40], given bounds on the size of disturbances that can act on
the system. Quantizing also introduces saturation, which can be quite problematic. However, the
negative effects of saturation may also be manged by increasing the number of bits (specifically
the number of integer bits) used to represent the underlying numbers [16, 40].
To provide more detail about the quantization process and its effect on the control law, we
introduce the set of fractional numbers
Q(n,m) :=
{
b ∈ Q | b = −bn2
n−m−1
+
n−1∑
i=1
2i−m−1bi ,bi ∈ {0, 1} ∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}
}
.
The quantization operator Q : R → Q is defined as Q(z) := argminz′∈Q(n,m) |z − z
′ |. With slight
abuse of notation, we use Q(A) and Q(x) to denote the entry-wise quantization of any A ∈ Rn×m
and x ∈ Rn , respectively. The quantized controller is then given by
C¯ : x¯[k + 1] =
{
A¯x¯[k] + B¯(s¯[k] − y¯[k]), k + 1modT > 0,
0, k + 1modT = 0,
(3a)
u¯[k] = C¯x¯[k], (3b)
where A¯i j = Q(Ai j ), B¯i j = Q(Bi j ), C¯i j = Q(Ci j ), s¯i [k] = Q(si [k]), and y¯i [k] = Q(yi [k]). We use
the bar, e.g., x¯ , to denote the quantized version of any variable, e.g., x . The map from fixed point
numbers to the integers Z2n′ is borrowed from [16] to define
sˆi [k] = (2
ms¯i [k])mod2
n′
, (4a)
yˆi [k] = (2
my¯i [k])mod2
n′
, (4b)
Aˆi j = (2
mA¯i j )mod2
n′
, (4c)
Bˆi j [k] = (2
(k modT+1)mB¯i j )mod 2
n′
, (4d)
Cˆi j = (2
mC¯i j )mod2
n′
, (4e)
xˆi [k] = (2
(k modT+1)mx¯i [k])mod2
n′
, (4f)
uˆi [k] = (2
(k modT+2)mu¯i [k + 1])mod2
n′
, (4g)
where n′ = (nx + 1)T +nu +n(T + 2) to prevent overflows. Here, for simplicity, we assume that all
scalar components of vectors use the same n andm, but these values can differ for various parts of
the controller in general [16]. Then the quantized controller can then be rewritten to operate on
ciphertexts as
C˜ : x˜i [k + 1] =
{[
⊕
nx
j=1(Aˆi j ⊗ x˜ j [k])
]
⊕
[
⊕
ny
j=1(Bˆi j [k] ⊗ (s˜j [k] − y˜j [k]))
]
, k + 1modT > 0,
E(0,κp), k + 1modT = 0,
(5a)
u˜i [k] = ⊕
nx
j=1(Cˆi j ⊗ x˜ j [k]), (5b)
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Fig. 2. Schematic diagram of the custom digital system for encrypted control.
where ⊕, ⊗ are defined in (2) and the tilde is used to denote the encrypted integers; i.e., u˜i [k] =
E(uˆi [k],κp), s˜j [k] = E(sˆj [k],κp ), y˜j [k] = E(yˆj [k],κp ), x˜ j [k] = E(xˆ j[k],κp ). Finally, the control
signal at the actuator is computed by
uˆi [k] = D(u˜i [k],κp ,κs )mod 2
n′
, (6a)
u¯i [k] = 2
−(k modT+2)m(uˆi [k] − 2
n′
1uˆi [k]≥2n
′−1), (6b)
where 1p is equal to one if statement p holds and is equal to zero otherwise.
3 DIGITAL DESIGN
Timing is an important issue when implementing controllers in real-time. While the maximum
computation to be performed by the controller is effectively the same in every iteration, imple-
mentations on a general purpose microprocessor based system are subject to variable timing per-
formance dependent on operating system scheduling. Even without an operating system, the time
sequential nature of software implementations for execution on a general purpose processor can be
limiting from the perspective of achievable sampling rate. Such implementations are therefore not
acceptable for systems with strict deadlines. This motivates the development of a custom digital
engines for performing the computations. Hardware implementation of homomorphic encryption
based secure feedback control can result in faster sampling rates than software implementations,
thereby broadening the applicability of encryption based methods for securing feedback control
systems. The speedup of a digital design in hardware over a software design can be from many
aspects. Hardware designs are able to take advantage of full parallelism, while software designs
typically run sequentially on a few parallel threads, and are thus limited in their parallelism. Hard-
ware designs can also introduce pipelining into data paths, where the computation is divided into
a pipeline of sequential stages, with stages all running at the same time, and each stage passing its
result to the next stage [57]. This can be used to increase achievable data throughput compared
to sequential software designs, as new data can be passed through the first stage of the pipeline
while there is still data to be processed in the subsequent stages.
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Algorithm 1 Right-to-left method for modular exponentiation using Montgomery multiplication
in modulusM = N 2
1: Parameters
2: N Paillier public key
3: R Montgomery radix
4: Inputs
5: B Integer base in Montgomery form B = bRmodN 2
6: E Integer exponent with l bits
7: Outputs
8: P Power in Montgomery form P = bERmodN 2
9: functionMontExp(B, E)
10: P ← RmodN 2
11: for i = 1, ..., l do
12: if Emod 2 = 1 then
13: P ← MontMult[M = N 2](P,B)
14: end if
15: E ← ⌊E/2⌋
16: B ← MontMult[M = N 2](B,B)
17: end for
18: return P
19: end function
Figure 2 illustrates the schematic diagram of the custom digital system for encrypted control
discussed in this section. There are three major parts: encryption and decryption units, in the
plant interface, and the physical system controller unit, accessed over a network. Each of these
units includes a digital engine controller, which orchestrates data flow through the components
of these systems, according to a corresponding algorithmic state machine. The activity of each
major part is triggered by external events. Encryption is periodically triggered by the generation
of samples of the plant output. Physical system controller and decryption unit activity is triggered
by the arrival of data over the network.
In this section, we describe plant interface (encryption and decryption) and physical system
controller blocks in Figure 2. Modular multiplication and modular exponentiation are important
recurring elements in all of these blocks. Therefore, we start by describing these elemental building
blocks in Subsection 3.1. We then describe the controller in Subsection 3.2 and the plant interface
in Subsection 3.3.
3.1 Modular Multiplication and Exponentiation
In many homomorphic encryption schemes, including Paillier encryption, efficient implementa-
tion of modular exponentiation is essential for fast encryption, decryption, and homomorphic
operations; see Subsection 2.2. Within the context of secure feedback control implementation, the
time it takes to perform encryption, decryption and homomorphic operations on cyphertexts, is a
lower bound on the control loop sample period, which when reduced, typically leads to improved
performance for systems with fast dynamics (e.g., an unstable inverted pendulum). Note that, in
principle, it is possible to decrease the time required for computations by decreasing the encryption
key length; however, this would reduce the security of the system which is not desirable.
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Algorithm2 [22]ModifiedCoarsely IntegratedOperand Scanning (CIOS)method variant ofMont-
gomery multiplication using 16 bits per word and without the final conditional subtraction.
1: Parameters
2: M Odd modulus
3: w Number of 16 bit words such thatM < 216w
4: M ′ such thatMM ′mod216 = 216 − 1
5: Inputs
6: X Input such that X < 2M
7: Y Input such that Y < 2M
8: Outputs
9: T Such that T modM = XYR−1modM ,T < 2M , where R = 216(w+1), RR−1 modM = 1
10: functionMontMult(X ,Y )
11: T = 0
12: for i = 1, ...,w + 1 do
13: Z ← X (Y mod 216)
14: Y ← ⌊Y/216⌋
15: m ← ((T mod 216) + (Z mod216))M ′mod 216
16: T ← (T + Z +mM)/216
17: end for
18: returnT
19: end function
We utilize the right-to-left binary method for calculatingmodular exponentiation, which is sum-
marized in Algorithm 1. The algorithm is particularly useful for our application as it allows for the
parallelization of the two modular multiplications in each iteration. This gives a speedup of up
to two times, and results in a constant latency as the modular multiplication in line 13 in Algo-
rithm 1 is performed in parallel to the modular multiplication that must be always performed in
each iteration in line 16 in Algorithm 1. The right-to-left binary method for exponentiation in-
volves calculating many sequential modular multiplications. The algorithm best suited for this
purpose is Montgomery multiplication [38]. It removes the need to perform a trial division by
the modulus which is an expensive operation in hardware, and instead only involves additions,
multiplications, and right shifts; e.g., see Algorithm 2. However, for it to be useful for implement-
ing modular multiplications, its operands must be converted to Montgomery form, and the result
must be converted back from Montgomery form. These conversions can be done using additional
Montgomery multiplications. The Montgomery form of an integer a when using a modulus of M
is (aR)modM , where the Montgomery radix R is typically a power of 2, larger than M . In the
right-to-left binary implementation of modular exponentiation, subsequently, referred to as Mont-
gomery exponentiation, the conversions to and from the Montgomery form only occur before and
after the exponentiation, as the intermediate (theoretical) conversions between the sequential mul-
tiplications within the exponentiation cancel out [38]. The block diagram for a realization of the
Montgomery exponentiator is illustrated in Figure 3.
Many hardware designs for computing Montgomery multiplications exist. A design involving
the Karatsuba multiplication algorithm can be used to evaluate very large multiplications [11].
While this proved to be computationally effective in [11], such a method may not be suitable for
some applications due to prohibitive hardware resource required for evaluating Montgomery mul-
tiplications even with relatively small operands. Another method for implementing Montgomery
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Fig. 3. Block diagram of the Montgomery exponentiator using two modular Montgomery multipliers.
multiplication involves using the Coarsely Integrated Operand Scanning (CIOS) variant [26] with
a word size of a single bit. Implementations of this algorithm are described in [12, 31]. The bitwise
approach greatly simplifies the architecture of the Montgomery multiplier, as it is only required to
perform additions and right shifts. However, the bitwise design cannot make use of the multi-bit
word embedded multipliers available on most modern FPGA devices.
A blockwise implementation of the CIOS method of Montgomery multiplication is ideal for the
purposes of this paper as it is amenable to the use of embedded multipliers in FPGAs to perform
smaller multiplications. Some implementations of this algorithm are discussed in [6, 37, 48]. These
implementations range from using a constant number of embedded multipliers to the case where
the number of embedded multipliers scales linearly with the number of bits in the operands to
perform large parallel multiplications. Therefore, based on the amount of the available hardware
resources, an appropriate implementation of the blockwise CIOS-based Montgomery multiplier
can be designed to ensure the resources are utilized effectively.
In Algorithm 2, we borrow the modified CIOS method [22] with a word size of 16 bits. The
modified CIOS method removes the conditional final subtraction in typical Montgomery multipli-
cation implementations to reduce hardware resource consumption. Algorithm 2 also differs from
the conventional Montgomery multiplication in that it produces outputs that possibly have the
modulus M added to it, rather than an output in ZM . Such an output is acceptable as long as an
explicit conversion from this modified Montgomery form, through Montgomery multiplication by
1, is used to produce the final result [22].
Across allMontgomerymultipliers, we use the same value of theMontgomery radixR = 216(w+1),
where w is the smallest integer such that N 2 + 2 < 216w ; note that N 2 + 2 is the largest modulus
used in the system. Throughout the encrypted control system, there are only three different values
used as modulus, so these values can be coded into the Montgomery multipliers required, with an
input allowing for the selection of the modulus. In the Paillier encryption scheme, all modular
exponentiations have modulusM = N 2, where N is the public key.
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Fig. 4. Block diagram of control computation using the Montgomery multiplication and exponentiation.
These parallel blocks sit within the controller block in Figure 2.
In what follows, using the custom digital implementations of the Montgomery multipliers and
the Montgomery exponentiators as the underlying arithmetic blocks, we design plant interface
and physical system controller modules for an encrypted control system secured with the Paillier
encryption scheme. As shown in Figure 1, the plant interface performs encryptions of system
outputs and decryptions of control inputs, and the controller evaluates the control law securely
over encrypted data. The ciphertexts transmitted between the plant interface and the controller
are in the Montgomery form.
Parallelization is possible within the building blocks of the Montgomery multiplier and the
Montgomery exponentiator, and also in the designs of the plant interface and controller. Adding
parallelization increases the resource consumption of the hardware design, which is a limiting fac-
tor. To offset this, resources are reused whenever possible. In particular, the Montgomery multipli-
ers used to implement the Montgomery exponentiators can also be used whenever single modular
multiplications are required, rather than instantiating separate Montgomery multipliers for this
purpose.
3.2 Controller Module Design
Consider dynamic controllers in (5). There are computations for incorporating the state of the
controller into the generated control inputs, described in Algorithm 3, and for updating the state
of the controller, described in Algorithm 4. The update of the controller state can be performed
independently of the generation of the control inputs. Figure 4 illustrates the block diagram for a
possible realization of Algorithms 3 and 4. Because calculating the control inputs are independent
of each other, individual computations can all be performed in parallel using nu copies of the
multiplier and exponentiator. These parallelizations allow physical systems with more inputs and
outputs to be controlled, without increasing the time required to perform the encryptions and
decryptions. However, as a trade-off more hardware resources are required, and so in resource
limited scenarios, these computations can be performed sequentially if a longer sampling period
is acceptable. In the case that the computations all be performed sequentially, the controller would
require only one Montgomery exponentiator module. The matrix multiplications for updating the
state of the controller can also be parallelized for each row by utilizing nx copies of the multiplier
and exponentiator. The modular exponentiations can also be performed in parallel, and the results
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Algorithm 3 Computing the control input using the Montgomery multiplication and the Mont-
gomery exponentiation.
1: Parameters
2: N Paillier public key
3: R Montgomery radix
4: n′ Number of bits in mapping from fixed point numbers Q(n,m) to integers Z2n′
5: Cˆ Controller matrix
6: Inputs
7: x˜ Encrypted controller state in Montgomery form x˜1, ..., x˜nx
8: Outputs
9: u˜ Encrypted control inputs in Montgomery form u˜1, ..., u˜nu
10: function GenerateControl(y˜, s˜, x˜ )
11: for i = 1, ...,nu do ⊲ Generate encrypted scalar products
12: for j = 1, ...,nx do
13: vari j ← MontExp(x˜ j , Cˆi j )
14: end for
15: end for
16: for i = 1, ...,nu do ⊲ Homomorphically sum up encrypted scalar products
17: for j = 2, ...,nx do
18: vari1 ← MontMult[M = N 2](vari1, vari j )
19: end for
20: u˜i ← vari1
21: end for
22: return u˜
23: end function
are multiplied together afterwards in a binary tree structure with a latency of ⌈log2(nx +ny)⌉ times
the latency of the Montgomery multiplication.
3.3 Plant Interface Module Design
The plant interface’s role in the encrypted control system is to encrypt the plant outputs and
decrypt the control inputs. There is no requirement for a single plant interface that performs both
encryptions and decryptions, as these functionalities can be separated into distinct modules if the
actuators and the sensors are physically apart. However, a single plant interface module allows for
the reuse of hardware resources for both encryption and decryption, reducing the hardware cost
of the system.
Paillier encryption algorithm in Algorithm 5 requires values for rN modN 2 as inputs, which
is independent of the plaintext being encrypted. The steps required for generating rN modN 2
are described in Algorithm 6. A block diagram similar to Figure 4 can be employed for parallel
realization of the steps in Algorithm 6. Note that it is possible to generate the value of rN needed to
encrypt the next system output sample in parallel with the controller computations involving the
encryption of the current sample. This parallelization between the plant interface and controller
decreases the time required for completing the necessary tasks within a sampling period without
utilizing extra resources.
There are various approaches for generating cryptographically secure randomor pseudo-random
values for r . Random methods involve sampling a noise source, such as oscillator jitter; examples
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Algorithm 4 Updating state of the dynamic controller using the Montgomery multiplication and
the Montgomery exponentiation.
1: Parameters
2: N Paillier public key
3: R Montgomery radix
4: n′ Number of bits in mapping from fixed point numbers Q(n,m) to integers Z2n′
5: T Controller reset period
6: Aˆ Controller matrix
7: Bˆ[k] Controller matrix
8: Inputs
9: s˜ Encrypted setpoints in Montgomery form s˜1, ..., s˜ny
10: x˜ Encrypted controller state in Montgomery form x˜1, ..., x˜nx
11: Outputs
12: x˜ ′ Encrypted controller state in Montgomery form x˜ ′1, ..., x˜
′
nx
13: function UpdateState(x˜, e˜,k)
14: if k + 1modT = 0 then ⊲ Controller reset
15: for i = 1, ...,nx do
16: x˜ ′i ← RmodN
2
⊲ Encrypted value of 0, in Montgomery form
17: end for
18: else
19: for i = 1, ...,ny do ⊲ Generate encrypted error values
20: e˜i ← MontMult[M = N
2](MontExp(y˜, 2n
′
− 1), s˜)
21: end for
22: for i = 1, ...,nx do ⊲ Generate encrypted scalar products
23: for j = 1, ...,nx do
24: vari j ← MontExp(x˜ ′j , Aˆi j )
25: end for
26: for j = 1, ...,ny do
27: vari (j+nx ) ← MontExp(e˜, Bˆ[k]i j )
28: end for
29: end for
30: for i = 1, ...,nx do ⊲ Homomorphically sum up encrypted scalar products
31: for j = 2, ...,nx + ny do
32: vari1 ← MontMult[M = N 2](vari1, vari j )
33: end for
34: x˜ ′i ← vari1
35: end for
36: end if
37: return x˜ ′
38: end function
can be found in [4, 36, 49]. Pseudo-randommethods are algorithms that generate numbers from an
initial seed, which should be generated from a randommethod; examples can be found in [7, 8]. De-
pending on the method used, the generator can be implemented on the FPGA, or external to it. The
generated random numbers are used as the input to Algorithm 6, which first converts them to the
Montgomery form, in order to compute rN . Note that, for larger encryption key lengths, checking
ACM Transactions on Cyber-Physical Systems, Vol. 0, No. 0, Article 0. Publication date: 2019.
Implementing Homomorphic Encryption Based Secure Feedback Control 0:15
Algorithm5 Encryption of the system outputs in the plant interface (or of the setpoints elsewhere)
using the Montgomery multiplication and the Montgomery exponentiation.
1: Parameters
2: N Paillier public key
3: R Montgomery radix
4: Inputs
5: yˆ System outputs yˆ1, ..., yˆny
6: z Values z1, ..., zny where zi = r
N
i modN
2
7: Outputs
8: y˜ Encrypted system outputs in Montgomery form y˜1, ..., y˜ny
9: function Encrypt(yˆ, z)
10: for i = 1, ...,ny do
11: var1 ← MontMult[M = N 2](NRmodN 2, yˆi )
12: var2 ← MontMult[M = N 2](var1 + 1,R2modN 2)
13: y˜i ← MontMult[M = N
2](zi , var2)
14: end for
15: return y˜
16: end function
Algorithm 6 Computing rN modN 2 in the plant interface using the Montgomery multiplication
and the Montgomery exponentiation.
1: Parameters
2: N Paillier public key
3: Inputs
4: r Random values r1, ..., rny
5: Outputs
6: z Values z1, ..., zny where zi = r
N
i modN
2
7: function CalculateRandom(r )
8: for i = 1, ...,ny do
9: zi ← MontExp(ri ,N )
10: end for
11: return z
12: end function
that gcd(r ,N ) = 1 is not required, as the probability that this is not the case is negligible. We also
do not need to convert random numbers to Montgomery form before performing Montgomery
exponentiation. Assume that we are given a uniformly distributed random number r in ZN . With
r ′ = (rR−1)modN 2, where R is the Montgomery radix, it can be seen r ′modN = (rR−1)modN
is also uniformly distributed random number in ZN because r 7→ (rR−1)modN is bijective (R
and N are coprime). Further, (r ′modN )N modN 2 = (r ′)N modN 2 because (α + kN )N modN 2 =
αN modN 2 for any α ,k ∈ Z. That is, the Montgomery form of r ′ is in fact r . Therefore, using
the Montgomery exponentiation algorithm without first converting to Montgomery form, we can
compute rN modN 2 which is equal to (r ′modN )NRmodN 2.
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Algorithm 7 Decryption of the control inputs in the plant interface using the Montgomery mul-
tiplication and the Montgomery exponentiation.
1: Parameters
2: N Paillier public key
3: R Montgomery radix
4: n′ Number of bits in mapping from fixed point numbers Q(n,m) to integers Z2n′
5: µ Part of Paillier private key
6: λ Part of Paillier private key
7: N −1 Value ∈ ZN 2+2 such that NN
−1mod(N 2 + 2) = 1
8: Inputs
9: u˜ Encrypted control inputs in Montgomery form u˜1, ..., u˜nu
10: Outputs
11: uˆ Control inputs uˆ1, ..., uˆnu
12: function Decrypt(u˜)
13: for i = 1, ...,nu do
14: temp ← MontExp(u˜i , λ)
15: temp ← MontMult[M = N 2](temp, 1)
16: temp ← MontMult[M = N 2 + 2](temp − 1,N −1R2 mod(N 2 + 2))
17: temp ← MontMult[M = N 2 + 2](temp, 1)
18: temp ← MontMult[M = N ](temp, µR2 modN )
19: uˆi ← MontMult[M = N ](temp, 1)mod2n
′
20: end for
21: return uˆ
22: end function
The tasks performed by the plant interface are described in Algorithms 5, 6, and 7, expressed as
a collection of the Montgomery exponentiations and the Montgomery multiplications. The inputs
to all of these Montgomery operations are either constants (as the algorithm parameters do not
change within any given implementation), algorithm inputs, or the result of the previous opera-
tions. Every loop in Algorithms 5, 6, and 7 can be parallelized, as the iterations are independent
of each other. For example, the encryptions of plaintexts are independent of each other, so indi-
vidual encryptions can all be performed in parallel. The same applies to the calculation of values
for rN modN 2, and to decryptions of the ciphertexts. If on the other hand the plant interface is
fully parallelized, then it would require max(ny ,nu )Montgomery exponentiators, as the maximum
number of encryptions or decryptions to be performed in parallel depends on whether there are
more system outputs to encrypt or more control inputs to decrypt.
4 EXPERIMENT
To demonstrate the system, we have implemented encrypted balance control of an inverted pen-
dulum using our plant interface and controller digital designs on an FPGA. Inverted pendulum sys-
tems are unstable and require a dynamic controller to be robustly stabilized. We use the Quanser
QUBE-Servo 2 as the plant and the Terasic C5P Development Board (equipped with the Cyclone V
GX 5CGXFC9D6F27C7 FPGA) to implement the plant interface and the encrypted controller. The
setup is shown in Figure 5.
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Fig. 5. Inverted pendulum balance control experimental setup.
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Fig. 6. The inverted pendulum system stabilizing to its setpoint. Note that the control input duty cycle is
signed to specify the direction of rotation for the motor.
Weuse the following dynamic controller with a control sampling frequency of 500Hz to stabilize
the inverted pendulum:
C : x[k + 1] =
[
03×3 03×1
125π
3072
[
500 0 625
]
0
]
x[k] +
[
I3×3
01×3
]
(s[k] − y[k]) (7a)
u[k] =
[125π
3072
[
−500 −2 −655
]
1
]
x[k], (7b)
s[k] =

0
θs [k]
1024
 , y[k] =

θ [k]
θ [k]
α[k]
 , (7c)
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Fig. 7. The inverted pendulum system with disturbances introduced at the tip of the pendulum. Note that
the control input duty cycle is signed to specify the direction of rotation for the motor.
where θ [k] is the measured rotational arm angle, θs [k] is the rotational arm angle setpoint, α[k]
is the measured pendulum angle, all in encoder counts (with 2048 encoder counts measured per
revolution), 0n×m is a matrix of zeros with n rows andm columns, and In×n is an identity matrix of
size n. The resulting control input u is a number between −999 and 999, representing a duty cycle
and direction. We implement this controller using n′ = 32 bits,m = 7 bits, and an encryption key
length of 256 bits. In Section 2, as there were no assumptions on the integer or fractional nature
of the parameters, all parameters were multiplied by 2m to generate equivalent integer numbers.
However, in this experiment, the sensor measurements and the C matrix are already integers, so
we use the following substitutions in our encrypted system:
sˆi [k] = s¯i [k]mod2
32 (8a)
yˆi [k] = y¯i [k]mod2
32 (8b)
Bˆi j = 2
7B¯i j mod2
32 (8c)
Cˆi j = C¯i j mod 2
32 (8d)
xˆi [k] = 2
7x¯i [k]mod2
32 (8e)
uˆi [k] = 2
7u¯i [k]mod2
32 (8f)
Since there is no state evolution (i.e., the state is a simple two steps delay to calculate veloci-
ties from position measurements by first order difference), a resetting the controller state is not
required. Rounding and clamping of the generated control input is performed externally from the
plant interface and controller.
We utilize the Montgomerymultiplier design in Algorithm 2, which has an embeddedmultiplier
usage that scales linearly with encryption key length. We run two Montgomery multipliers in
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parallel in each Montgomery exponentiator, and run a single Montgomery exponentiator in the
plant interface and controller modules. We neglect the generation of random numbers, but still
calculate a number to the power N in each control sampling period. We also neglect instantiating
a separate module to encrypt setpoints, and instead encrypt setpoint in the controller, without the
use of randomnumbers. Neither of these simplifications affect the synthesis, timing, or synthesis of
the digital design, as the randomnumber generation can be done outside of the digital engine using
commercially available integrated circuits for random number generation, and the encryption of
setpoints with random numbers can occur in parallel with the encryption of system outputs, thus
not extending the minimum control sampling period. Importantly, on the FPGA we have distinct
plant interface and controller modules and use an abstracted network to communicate encrypted
data between them.
Figure 9 shows the hardware resource usage of the plant interface module as the encryption key
length increases, for our implementation. Figure 8 shows the minimum control sampling period
as the encryption key length increases from 64 bits to 512 bits, which affects the speed with which
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physical systems can be controlled. For the key length of 512 bits, the sampling time of system is
10ms. Implementations using other Montgomery multiplier architectures can potentially result in
completely different hardware resource usages and speeds. Such issue are the topic of future work.
Figure 6 shows the system behaviour converging to its setpoint. Figure 7 shows the system
behaviour when disturbances are introduced at the tip of the pendulum. Evidently, the controller
successfully attenuates large disturbances (of peak magnitude of twenty degrees).
In the experiments, we found that the latency of the plant interface determines the maximum
control sampling frequency. This is due to Montgomery exponentiations with the large exponents
N and λ, which require moreMontgomerymultiplications compared to theMontgomery exponen-
tiations in the controller, where the exponents are shorter. If a larger control sampling frequency
is required, then the plant interface digital design could make use of the Chinese Remainder The-
orem [13] to reduce the size of the modulus in Montgomery exponentiations, speeding up each
calculation.
The hardware description language (HDL) code used for synthesizing the encryption, controller,
and decryption in the experiment can be found at https://github.com/availn/EncryptedControl. A
video of the experiment can also be found at https://youtu.be/ATM0tcecst0.
5 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTUREWORK
We presented an experimental setup to demonstrate a powerful framework for encrypted dynamic
control of unstable systems using digital designs on FPGAs with deterministic latency. The frame-
work is scalable and can be applied to large-scale cyber-physical systems. Future work includes
investigation of methods for speeding up the computations and studying the effect of uncertain
communication systems on the performance of the system.
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